Ni Wang


Welcome!

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. My research focuses on Macroeconomics and Labor Economics.

I am on the 2021/2022 job market.

You can find my C. V. here.

Contact: niwang(at)sas(dot)upenn(dot)edu


WORKING PAPERS

Job Attachment and Life Cycle Gender Wage Differences (Job Market Paper)

Employment interruptions are more common among women than men, with substantial individual-level heterogeneity. Employers value job attachment but job attachment is not directly observed. I show that the information problem of female job attachment is detrimental to female labor market outcomes. I propose a model where there is information asymmetry about female job attachment but not about male job attachment in a frictional labor market. To screen female job attachment, employers offer separating wage contracts that distort the wage profiles of high-attachment women. The distortions suppress female job-to-job mobility, resulting in worse labor market outcomes than comparable men. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I document evidence on the gender differences in mobility patterns and wage growth that support the assumptions and the predictions of the model. I then calibrate the model and quantify the contributing factors to the gender wage gap. The calibrated model captures the gender differences in the data. The gender difference in job-to-job mobility explains a majority of the life cycle gender wage gap.

Employee or Contractor: Work Arrangements under Hidden Actions and Unobserved Ability

This paper studies the endogenous formation of employment arrangements. Firms create production opportunities that need workers, whose effort and ability are not observed. Firms use incentive pay to induce effort from risk-averse workers and screen workers’ ability levels. Incentive contracts insure workers against output risks but subject workers to noisy monitoring. Firms spin off jobs to contractors when monitoring is too noisy or when effort is crucial. I characterize all equilibrium outcomes of employment arrangements for workers of different abilities. Only high-ability workers may work as contractors out of all outcomes.